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ABSTRACT
The change to a prospective payment system tor Medicare 
and Medicaid patients has torced hospital laboratories to 
adopt new management strategies. This paper examines those 
strategies and proposes that hospitals that are more stressed 
under the new payment system wi11 adopt more ot these 
strategies. Data is gathered through a survey o-f -four hos­
pitals in a local service area, and analyzed to test the 
hypotheses.
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I„INTRODUCTION
Annual expenditures on personal medical services have 
increased -from 10.8 billion in 1950 to 150 billion by 1977.
In 1967 43 billion or 5.67 of the 6NP (from 4. 17 in 1950) was 
spent on personal medical services. By 1977 8.27. of the GNP 
was being allocated to personal medical services. Even after 
adjustment of these figures for papulation increases, per 
capita medical expenditures over the last 20 years have 
s t a y e d  very close to the annual percentage increase in total 
medical expenditure from $78.35 per year in 1950 to $736.92 
per year in 1977.(1) The federal government has financed the 
largest portion of this bill, accounting for 40 billion of 
the 150 billion spent in 1977.(2)
The rapid and continuing increase in the amount of our 
nation-’s resources being devoted to personal medical services 
and the increasing role of our government in financing those 
services has raised the issue of health to the forefront of 
public policy and opinion. In a book entitled I_n Cr i t i cal 
Cond i t i o n , Senator Edward Kennedy addressed his readers as 
follows: "Are you aware that all Americans today (1972) are
paying over 170 percent of the hospital daily service charges 
they paid in 1960? Do you know that medical costs force 
Americans of every income level to mortgage their families 
future, sell their homes, give up their children’s college 
education and even declare bankruptcy'? Many are hounded by
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collection agencies hired by hospitals and doctors. Many 
have their salaries garnisheed; some are sued."(3) If public 
wrath was engendered against the practitioners of health care 
in 1972 when Kennedy wrote this book, one can hardly imagine 
how incendiary the fury has become in the period of 1980's 
inflation. Scrutiny of the economics of health care deliv­
ery has became even sharper.
In the 1980’s it has become a national concern to halt 
this spiralling inflation in health care. The most effective 
measure so far has been the institution of a prospective pay­
ment system for Medicare and Medicaid. The prospective pay­
ment system, called Diagnostic Related Groups (BRG’s), limits 
the amount the government will pay for each hospital stay of 
a Medicare or Medicaid patient. It seems deceptively simple, 
the hospital receives one per capita payment for each DRG 
(patient) admitted. If it uses more resources treating that 
patient than the government will pay for, it looses that 
money. But, those hospitals that can treat that patient for 
less than what the government is willing to pay, are rewarded 
as being cost-effective by being allowed to pocket part of 
the savings. This is the federal government’s plan to force 
hospitals to accomplish two objectives: to lower their
operating costs and bring their increases in line with the 
general inflation rate; and to place hospital administrator’s 
in the role of controlling the physicians who are the 
purchasers of the expensive hospital resources (for their
pati e nt).
So far the plan seems to be working. Hospital occupancy 
rates are down across the nation, lengths of stay for Medi — 
care and Medicaid patients have been reduced, and many pro­
cedures that once were done routinely' at hospitals are now 
done in other facilities. <4> The cumulative effect of all 
this is that hospitals are scrambling to fill beds and rec­
over from low occupancy rates that have left them in the role 
the American automakers were in when foreign imports forced 
them to rethink their entire operations. Hospitals are being 
forced to think in terms of the costs of services they offer 
and how they offer them. They are caught in a period of org­
anisational crisis and to survive they must learn to operate 
in the most efficient way possible and to cut costs anywhere 
they can.
This paper examines how hospitals have responded to 
DRS’s by looking at one part of the hospital that may be 
severely effected, the hospital’s laboratory. As one of the 
hospital’s largest ancillary departments, the effect of D RB’s 
has been to convert the laboratory from a profit center to a 
cost center. In the past, the more tests ordered on a 
patient the more money paid to the hospital from the old 
retraspective payment system that reimbursed the hospital for 
all costs incurred in treating the patient. But with DRG’s, 
more tests simply raise the cost of treating each patient, 
and increase the likelihood that the hospital will spend more 
treating that patient than the government will pay and there­
by accruing additional costs to the hospital.
In this era of cost containment the hospital may respond 
to both -financial and political pressures by adopting certain 
strategies that would decrease expenditures on inpatients 
while increasing revenue from outpatient procedures, which 
are not covered under D RG’s. These strategies would force 
the hospital to possibly make certain management decisions 
within the laboratory that could range from severe change to 
"business as usual". This paper will study how DRG’s has 
effected hospital laboratories and how dependent that change 
is on the severity of pressure being put on an individual 
hospital. In simple terms it will examine the effect of the 
prospective payment system on hospital management decisions 
that effect the laboratory.
The paper will be a case study of a mid-sized midwestern 
city with four hospitals serving the county area. A survey, 
attached in the appendix, will be sent to each hospital’s 
administrati on to determine the financial and political 
pressure it is operating under along with some basic 
information about the hospital itself. A phone or personal 
interview will be conducted with the laboratory manager to 
determine what management strategies have been instituted in 
their lab since DRG’s. The information will then be studied 
to see if those hospitals with the higher pressures effect 
more survival management strategies on their labs.
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11. BACKGROUND
Revi ew of. Prospect i ve Payment
Prospective payment may be the most revolutionary dev­
elopment in the health care field since the introduction of 
Medicare itself in the 6 0 ’s. Critics of the Medicare system 
have observed that the retrospective cost reimbursement pol­
icy contained a very positive incentive for excessive spend­
ing, Since its inception, Medicare has rapidly grown into a 
major government expense, in 19S3 alone $-54 billion in bill­
ings were submitted.(5) Requirements for greater efficiency 
and cost effectiveness in Medicare and the health care system 
as a whole is an issue whose solutions have been long over­
due. Prospective payment is the government’s solution. The 
purpose and intent of D RG’s and the prospective payment sys­
tem is to provide more incentive to be cost conscious and 
less incentive to provide unnecessary services.
For the past three decades, the financial incentives 
built into the hospital reimbursement system rewarded in­
creases in access, meaning increases in the number of facil­
ities, beds and services. Also rewarded were increases and 
improvements in quality, such as the newest technology and 
more highly trained personnel. The post-World War II con—
struction era, -fueled by Hi 11-Burton grants, and the growth 
o-f services under the Medicare program show how hospitals 
have responded to the financial incentives of this period.
Now under the Medicare prospective pricing law, the financial 
incentives are changing. The government has not abandoned 
access or quality as concerns, but clearly, the emphasis of 
the new payment system is on cost containment. The 
government is trying to stem the rising expenditures for 
Medicare. By rewarding hospitals which keep their costs below 
Medicare's preset prices, the government hopes to encourage 
more cost-conscious management and cost-effective clinical 
decision making by hospitals and physicians.
The Medicare prospective payment system came from the 
federal government's need to reduce its rate of increase in 
health care expenditures. A cost based approach to doing 
this was the basis of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibil­
ity Act of 1982(TEFRA). TEFRA set cost-per-case limits for 
hospital payments for the next three fiscal years. But Con­
gress, in direct response to the continuing rise in Medicare 
expenditures and the forecast of serious deficits in the Soc­
ial Security trust fund (including the Medicare trust fund), 
perceived a need to change the financial incentives in the 
Medicare payment system. The severity of the problem faced 
by Congress is described in a study by the Congressional Bud­
get Office (CBO). Noting that Medicare outlays increased at 
an annual rate of 20°/. between 1980 and 1982, the CBO study 
predicted; "Under the projections, Medicare wi11 constitute
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10"/. of the Cfederali] budget by 1988 and the Hospital Insur­
ance Trust Fund will be exhausted by late 1987. 1 (6)
Congress acted swiftly to further restrain any increas­
es under the Medicare system by passing the Social Security 
Amendment of 1983, Public Law 98-21, prospective payment re­
form. The Congressional aim was to:
1)Project accurately the annual outflow of Medicare 
funds.
2)Restrain the rate of increase of federal expenditures 
under the Medicare program.
3) Reverse providers1’ economic incentives by rewarding 
hospitals financially for keeping costs under set 
pr i ces.
4)Place hospitals at financial risk for utilization of 
resources that exceed the set prices.
5)Use hospitals to encourage more cost-conscious behav­
iour by physicians. <7)
As its basis for setting prices, the Medicare plan uses 
a patient c 1assification system of diagnosis-related groups 
(DRGs). The E>RG system assumes that hospital cases can be 
grouped into clinically coherent classifications— DRGs— which 
are similar in resource consumption.The DRG patient 
c 1assification was developed at Yale and the Health Care Fin­
ancing Administration helped fund its development and its 
implementation on an experimental basis in New Jersey hospi­
tals . <8)
The hospitals covered by the law operated one fiscal
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year under TEFRA’s cost-per-case limits before moving to the 
new DRG system. Prospective pricing replaced TEFRA for 
hospital fiscal years that began on or after October 1, 
1983.(9) Prospective pricing applies to all hospitals 
except children’s, psychiatric, rehabilitation, and long-term 
care hospitals. The prospective pricing law covers only 
inpatient services. Hospital outpatient services, capital 
costs, and educational expenses will continue to be 
reimbursed on the basis of retrospectively determined costs.
Although the Reagan administration recommended and Con­
gress considered going immediately to a single, national DRG 
price list, the final legislation provided for a transitional 
period of three years. During these first years the hospit­
a l ’s own specific costs are taken into account in computing 
reimbursements. But consideration of hospital-specific costs 
steadily diminish until, by year four of the program, the 
hospital’s payment is based entirely on a national DRG price 
list, adjusted only for urban and rural differences and area 
wages.
The Medicare system fundamentally changes the way hos­
pitals do business. Under cost-based reimbursement, the more 
services provided, the more the hospital received, within 
limits. Under prospective pricing, the hospital will now be 
at risk for the difference between its costs and the prices 
set and paid per discharge by Medicare. Thus, it will become 
increasingly important for hospitals to manage patient ser­
vice volumes effectively in order to keep their overall costs
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below the DRG prices. No one seems to know how hospital man­
agers will react to this new era of prospective payment, but 
many have speculated. In the review of the literature art­
icles were looked for that explain how organizations cope 
with crisis and retrenchment, especially hospitals, in order 
to form some hypotheses on how hospitals will manage their 
laboratories under these types of conditions.
Li terature Review
For purposes of reviewing the literature, one main topic 
area was looked at, that of retrenchment and crisis.
Articles were found on how organizations in general cope with 
periods of scarcity and many more articles on how hospitals 
and laboratories might cope with their period of scarcity - 
the era of prospective payment. Most of these articles, are 
speculative in nature. Scarcity is a new concept in the 
health care field and we have not coped with it long enough 
to see many studies on how or why we respond in certain ways.
One interesting study on how organizations cope with 
crisis was written by Mil burn, Schuler, and Watman. They de­
fined both a personal and an organizational response to cri­
sis. The organizational response could be short term and then 
focus on the long term. The short term responses were a ten­
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dency to centralize operations, and to switch to quantifiable 
concepts to evaluate performance. This means an organiza­
tion's first response might be to " look to the leader " in 
any decision making and to "tighten the belt " by emphasizing 
cost effectiveness and efficiency. Layoffs and merging dep­
artments to eliminate duplication of services might be ex­
amples of these belt-tightening measures. In the long term 
other strategies might appear such as replacing the chief ex­
ecutive or getting into new products and markets.(10)
Most other articles were from the public sector and 
tended to emphasize layoffs as the only response to periods 
of cutbacks in funds. If we examine the public sector in 
regards to the article by Milburn et. a l ., the short term 
strategies are the only ones available to them. A state 
mental health department cannot diversify into other markets 
or services without approval of the legislature, in essence 
they are captured by their own market and many of the con­
cepts Milburn applies to private sector companies cannot be 
applied to the public sector. In times of crisis, organiz­
ations do what they can in the form of short term strategies, 
and hope that funding may return with the next administra­
tion.
Hospitals have always been stuck in the category of 
quasi-public institutions because they' operate in a sector 
that is public concern and yet the predominant hospital form 
is private not for profit. In adopting long and short term 
strategies for survival the consensus seems to be to act more
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like a business and less like a public agency. Howard and 
Beatrice Rowland speak through experience at the "Troubled 
Hospital Syndrome". This syndrome usually happens to 
hospitals experiencing low occupancy rates and chronic 
deficits. When hospitals experience these they usually 
respond in three ways. They take inside steps to raise 
revenue and cut costs, such as raising charges, boosting 
admissions through physician recruitment or adding new 
services or cutting costs with voluntary time off or layoffs. 
The second response is usually to improve the physical plant 
in order to make it more attractive to both patient and phys­
ician. An aggressive building plan at a time of low revenue 
is thought by the authors to be a sign of extreme trouble in 
the organisation. Lastly a hospital in trouble will try to 
merge with another hospital or corporation in order to bail­
out its losses.(11) The authors base these strategies on 
experience only and yet they seem to coincide with Mil burn's 
article on coping strategies of organizations in general.
The focus of most of the articles on hospital adaptive 
strategies to DRG's are prospective "how to" types of arti­
cles that emphasize business strategies to cope with this new 
period of retrenchment. One article titled, "Positioning Ac­
ademic Medical Centers To Thrive In The Next Decade.", pre­
dicts a 20 to 257. decrease in hospital beds by 1990. Hosp­
ital strategy in this period of decline must be to increase 
their share of the market. To do this they must have a 
selective marketing strategy towards their excellent programs
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and maintain a competitive cost advantage over other medical 
centers. The author suggests three ways to do this that may 
sound familiar; a merger or acquisition to increase beds and 
enhance informal and formal "networking"; enhance brand name 
recognition to diff©rentiate hospital products in the market 
place; and consider alternative sources of revenue and market 
them.(12)
Another article by liidyette and Loup says much the same 
thing in the form of a "market based hospital prospective 
payment action plan". They' recommend applying market strat­
egies for DRG survival. Their plan includes cost cutting 
strategies such as finding the true costs of each DRG and 
identifying which are your hospitals "winners and losers". 
Also improving operations in areas where costs can be cut 
such as medical records, discharge planning, medical staff, 
admitting and ancillary departments may help tremendously. 
They also recommend considering alternative sources of rev­
enue and marketing t h em.(13)
Most of the articles found, that apply these strategies 
to the laboratory were only speculative in nature. Few of 
the articles deal with what has been done, since DRG's is so 
new we are only speculating on what could be done to reduce 
cost and expand new markets. The strategies proposed fall 
into the two categories of cost containment and marketing new 
products. Labs may choose to reduce costs in several ways 
and at the same time market specific revenue producing tests, 
those tests that are done on outpatients that are not subject
to DRG reimbursement.
The simplest way to reduce costs in a labor intensive 
area like the laboratory is to decrease staffing. This may 
be done by layoff or slowly by not replacing employees as 
turnover occurs., also hours may be cut back voluntarily with­
out layoffs occurring. No articles based solely on layoffs 
as effective cost cutting strategy were found but many 
suggested more harmless alternatives such as redistributing 
staff and using "flex time" to reduce nonproductive hours. A 
survey done by the magazine Medical Laboratory Observer found 
that as early as 1984, 60% of hospital labs had changed
scheduling, and as much as 33% had cut staff, during the 
first year of prospective payment. <14) An alternative way to 
reduce labor costs, that has been suggested, is to substitute 
lower paid(lower trained) personnel for higher priced 
employees. One article sees hospitals saying in the future 
"technologists are too expensive... let's hire MLT's for the 
bench, and use med techs for supervisory positions." The same 
article says that in New Jersey the market for medical 
technologists is already tighter and students are having a 
harder time finding jobs. Other cost cutting strategies 
suggested were review of purchasing procedures to find more 
cost effective vendors, more use of highly automated 
machinery, and making some reagents in the lab instead of 
buying them.
One area laboratories may be able to cut costs is in in­
fluencing physician orders. Possible ways to influence phy~
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sieian ordering might be through education to reduce unecess- 
ary orders, analog testing, enhanced reporting through com­
puters, or simply reducing turn-around time in order to re­
duce numbers of duplicate orders. A complicated study done 
by a hospital in Detroit tested the idea that i f physicians 
were educated to the costs of the tests they were ordering 
they would reduce unnecessary testing. Conclusions were that 
cost—awareness information alone did not significant1y alter 
ordering patterns.(15) Another article by Brenda Becker cor­
roborates the Detroit study, in fact attempts at what she 
refers to as "utilization control" in New Jersey have been 
so poor that one frustrated lab manager says "At our 
community hospital, each physician is a little private 
enterprise, and nobody is going to tell some of them what to 
do... doctors don^t care about DRG ■' s ... they want results and 
that?s it." (16) These experiences suggest that methods that 
change lab behavior such as analog testing, enhanced reports 
and reduced turn-around time might be more effective 
strategies. Analog testing is where a 1ab automatically 
continues to the next logical test, without a physicians 
order, if a positive test is found. This reduces the need to 
wait for a physician response and may speed up diagnosis 
allowing a patient to receive treatment sooner and reduce 
length of stay. Enhanced reporting simply gives the physician 
more information to base diagnostic decisions on therefore 
letting him make wiser and more cost effective utilization of 
lab resources. One last option would be to increase weekend
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and off—hour coverage to reduce the turn—around time of lab 
tests allowing patients to be discharged sooner.
The ultimate and more drastic cost-cutting strategy 
suggested in many o+ the articles was to "unbundle" the hos­
pital lab or contract with an outside lab to do more of their 
testing, leaving only a small "stat lab" in house.
Unbundling is the buzzword tor removing a service from 
hospital corporate control and establishing the service under 
a separate corporate entity. This allows the lab to compete 
as a reference lab and to solicit business without the 
interference of government intervention. One article by 
Leslie Brennan suggests that unbundling may not be the pan­
acea it proposes to be, hospitals may not have the capital 
required to come up to a level competitive with existing ref­
erence labs. "Not only would hospitals have to invest in new 
instrumentation and added technical personnel, they would 
also need marketing staffs, courier services, and a heavy 
commitment to computerization."(16) The trend may be towards 
doing stat work in house and contracting out for routine high 
volume tests to a reference lab either affiliated with the 
hospital or not.
One final cost cutting strategy might be to eliminate 
the teaching programs for Medical Technology interns. These 
programs cost money to run and may not produce much in the 
way of tangible rewards. With the market being reduced for 
med tech interns and fewer of them being hired hospitals may 
drop their programs, especially if further Medicare
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legislation does not allow reimbursement of these costs.
In the area of marketing services, the strategy seems to 
be to increase the amount of testing done under outpatient 
reimbursement and to make up for lost inpatient volumes by 
marketing outpatient testing to local physicians. To be cost 
competitive with other labs the lab manager must know the 
true costs that go into production of each test in order to 
be price competitive, but in this area hospital labs are 
still hampered by federal regulations that reimburse them for 
only 62V. of the prevailing charges for that test. (17)
11 I.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Conceptual Model
With all the articles found, there was one prevailing 
weakness., no one has studied what is happening because it's 
all too knew yet. But the review of the literature suggests 
an area of study that might be interesting to pursue. 
Rowland's concept of the troubled hospital might apply' to all 
hospitals under DRG’s,, where revenues and occupancy ratios 
are dropping due to prospective pricing. In that case how 
many of them will adopt the cost cutting strategies suggest­
ed in these articles and in their book. The model this paper 
proposes is that all hospitals under the prospective payment 
system are subject to financial and possibly' political 
pressures to varying degrees and that because of these 
pressures they will adopt one or more of the hospital adapt­
ive strategies outlined in the literature review. These 
strategies will effect management decisions in the laboratory 
and force labs to pursue some of the proposed cost saving or 
marketing available.
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MODEL
F'F'S 
(DRG7 s)
FINANCIAL POL X TICAL
PRESSURE PRESSURE
HOSPITAL ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES
REDUCE INPATIENT 
EXPENDITURES
INCREASE OUTPATIENT 
EXPENDITURES
1 8
Hypotheses
The proposed hypotheses -for this study are listed below:
HI: Hospitals with high -Financial and political pressure will 
seek to reduce inpatient expenditures by decreasing staffing 
in their laboratory.
H2: Hospitals with high financial and political pressure will 
seek to reduce inpatient expenditures by substituting lower 
paid personnel for higher paid medical technologists.
H3: Hospitals with high financial and political pressure will
seek to reduce inpatient expenditures with more timely test 
reporting by increasing weekend and off-hour coverage, intro­
ducing analog testing and providing physicians with enhanced 
report i n g .
H4: Hospitals with high financial and political pressure will
seek to reduce inpatient expenditures by eliminating their 
teaching programs.
H5: Hospitals with high financial and political pressure will
seek to reduce inpatient expenditures by' contracting out for
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inpatient lab testing.
H6s Hospitals with high financial and political pressure will 
seek to increase outpatient procedures by marketing their lab 
to physician-'s offices.
H 7 : Hospitals with high financial and political pressure will 
seek to1 increase outpatient procedures by performing more 
pre-admission and post-admission testing.
These relationships are taken directly from the litera­
ture review. Mil burns study of short term and long term 
strategies in crisis situations suggest many of the adaptive 
strategies suggested again in the hospital and laboratory 
literature, that short term they will stress efficiency and 
long term focus will be on new markets or products. If we 
narrow this down to choices available at the laboratory level 
we come up with the types of management decisions proposed in 
the above hypotheses. There are other decisions available to 
the lab manager but many of these would be difficult or 
impossible to measure and not within the scope of this study.
The independent variables of financial and political 
pressure may be the hardest to measure and the most subject­
ive measurements in the study. Financial pressure may be 
inferred using several indicators, Rowland suggests several 
and for purposes of this study we will use two of their 
indicators plus one more that makes sense to this author.(17)
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For this study' a subjective index o-f high -financial pressure 
will be assigned by observing the -foil owing about a hospital;
(l)Expenses exceed revenues -for more than six months 
of the last fiscal year.
<2)The cost per case (cal cu.l ated by length of stay
multiplied by cost per patient day-') is higher than 
the national average.
(3)The drop in occupancy ratio since DRG’s was implem­
ented exceeds 10%
A definition of political pressure may be even harder to det­
ermine since political pressure may come from many direct­
ions, including the community, employee groups such as un­
ions, physicians and interested companies who insure large 
groups for health care. Again a subjective index of polit­
ical pressure may be determined using the following as indi­
cators;
(1)Any recent activity by the community to gain repre­
sentation with the hospital.
(2)Any increase in union activity such as a strike 
threat or unionization effort.
(3) Any move by' the medical staff to organize into a 
stranger position in relation to the administration.
(4)Any move by a insurer group or business to negotiate 
better rates for their employees.
These are at best only' indicators of the variables im­
portant to the study, but perceptive interviewing should give 
a fair indication of the pressure each hospital is under.
2 1
Basic information about each hospital will also be asked at 
each interview in case differences occur that may be later 
explained in terms of organisational structure or type of 
f und i n g .
The dependent variables are those management strategies 
outlined in the literature review. These management 
strategies are the ones most likely to happen if hospitals 
are indeed in crisis ie. feeling financial and political 
pressure due to D RG’s. It will be interesting to see if 
there is a direct relationship between hospitals with the 
highest financial and political pressure and those that 
pLtrsue the most adaptive strategies.
liethodol q q v
This study will be limited to a case study of four hos­
pitals located in a mid-size mi dwestern town. No statistical 
measures can be applied to such a small sample. Data will be 
collected in a series of phone or personal interviews con­
ducted with either the chief executive officer or the chief 
financial officer for the institution. Data on lab manage­
ment decisions will be collected through personal interviews 
with the lab manager or lab administrator. A copy of propos­
ed questions is included in the appendix.
Because this study is restricted by its small size, it 
wi11 be hard to generalize information from this small sample 
to laboratories in general. Also the independent variables 
are so difficult to measure that it is possible that we may 
not be measuring them accurately enough. Finally we cannot 
find all the variables that go into the decision making in an 
instituti o n , therefore we may be attributing relati onshi ps 
when something entirely out of the scope of this study caused 
the decision to be made. In other words, in the real world 
we cannot control experiments and therefore we can only 
presume a causal relationship between them, at best.
IV.RESULTS
The results of interviews at all four hospitals are pre­
sented in Table 1 and 2 at the end of this section. Three 
out of the four hospitals were private, not for profit type, 
and had similar bed size. Hospital B was a larger, "munici­
pal " hospital, with a rather loose association with the city. 
Hospital B receives no funds for operation from the city, but 
shares a common pension fund, civil service commision, and 
the mayor appoints members to its board of trustees. Hos­
pital A, the smallest of the four hospitals, is the only
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osteopathic hospital in the study. Hospitals A and C start­
ed on D R G ’s October 1,1983. Hospitals B and D started as of 
July i,1984. All hospitals have had at least one ■full year 
under DRG reimbursement.
Table 1 compiles all the data gathered for the 
independent variables. Occupancy rates, cost per patient 
day, length of stay, and cost per case data, were taken from 
data published monthly by the local health planning agency, 
GLS-HSA.(IB) Answers to all other questions were taken from 
personal interviews. Occupancy rates are measured in 
percentages, and the drop in occupancy after DRG?s is the 
most critical figure.
Looking at Table 1, the drop in occupancy at all four 
hospitals was at least 20“/.. Note that those hospitals with 
the lowest occupancy rates also had the lowest lengths of 
stay, which will account for their slightly lower rates.
From this statistic alone, financial pressure seems to be 
evenly distributed across the four hospitals. But if we look 
at cost per case, a clear difference between the hospitals 
may be seen. The national average for cost per case is 
approx i mat el y $3200. (19) Hospital B and C are 41/. and 24V. 
higher, respectively, than the national average. Using this 
indicator, these two hospitals would be the most financially 
stressed of the group. Because DRG's are reimbursed on a 
preset cost per case, those hospitals with higher than 
average costs will be more financially stressed under the
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TABLE 1
HOSPITAL A HOSPITAL B HQSFITAL C HOSPITAL D
BED SIZE 359 528 436 423
TYPE OF 
HOSPITAL
pri vate muni ci pal pri vate pri vate
OCCUPANCY 
(in 7.) 
Pre-DRG 77.2 90. 4 81. 2 87. 5
Post—DRG 52. 7 70. 8 60. 8 58. 7
7n Change -24. 5 -19. 6 -20. 4 -28. 8
COST PER 
PATIENT DAY $607 $673 $552 $529
LENGTH OF 
STAY(days) 5. 27 6. 71 7. 20 6 a 40
COST PER 
CASE 3199 4514 3972 3386
PRESSURE
Uni on no no yes no
Local
Groups no no no no
Physi ci an yes yes yes no
Insurers no yes yes no
system. A better indicator would be cost per case data on 
only Medicare and Medicaid patients, but this type of data 
was not available.
Political pressure was much harder to determine, and 
only a subjective measurement could be taken. From looking at 
Table 1 , Hospital D certainly seemed to be under the least
pressure from outside groups, unions, insurers, and 
physicians. Hospital A had felt some pressure from their 
physicians, and this is significant when we consider the 
decisions made in their lab later in the paper. Hospitals B 
and C seemed the most concerned with pressures from 
physicians and insurers. During interviews with 
administrators of these two hospitals, problems with insurer 
groups were mentioned several times. Overall Hospital C and 
B were the most politically pressured.
In order to give each hospital an overall ranking, 
occupancy rates should be ignored, since all four hospitals 
have dropped by at least 10%. The financial stress created 
by this variable is fairly even across the group. Political 
pressure, although Hospital B and C clearly have more "per­
ceived” pressures, is only a weak indicator , and I would 
consider it only as a modifier to financial pressure. In 
other words, if a hospital is feeling some real, measurable, 
financial pressure, then increased political pressure might 
force them into more drastic types of decisions. 1 he only 
objective measure found for financial pressure under DRG?s, 
is cost per case. If we look strictly at this variable, and
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more pressure A
less pressure \K
mod i f i er Jl the results are below:
Hospi tal B ( f i nanci a l , poli t i cal)
Hasp i tal C ( financial, poli ti cal)
Hosp i tal A < f i nanci a l , poli t i cal)
Hosp i tal D ( f i nanci a l , poli t i cal)
Table 1 would predict that Hospital B and C would institute 
more of the proposed lab management changes, than Hospitals A 
and B.
Table 2 includes data taken from interviews with each of 
the four hospital lab directors, and their records. Test 
volume for Hospital A includes only' those tests done in the 
hospital lab and another 600,000 tests are sent to an outside 
lab. Looking at Table 2, lab responses to DRG^s, those deci­
sions that were made in all the labs can be ignored. All 
labs had staff reductions, all have changed staffing pat­
terns, and all have felt an increase in outpatient testing.
In this study, all hospitals have felt some financial pres­
sure from a drop in occupancy, that may account for Hypo­
thesis 1 being true for all hospitals in the study. It is 
interesting to note that hospital B, the most financially 
stressed did not have a layoff, while all other hospitals 
did. Hospital B reduced staffing in the lab through early 
retirement and attrition. More than one of the administra­
tors at the other hospitals said Hospital B had "silently”
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TABLE 2
LAB A LAB B LAB C LAB D
ANNUAL TEST 620, 000 2,000i000 1,300,OOO 1 , 200, 000
FTE1 S 57. 8 109 63. 2 68
UNIONIZED yes yes no yes
STAFF REDUCED yes yes yes yes
HOW? 1ayoff ear 1 y 
ret i rement, 
attr i t i on
1ayof f 1ayof f
SUBSTITUTION* no yes yes yes
STAFFIN6 PATTERN 
CHANGE
yes yes yes yes
PHYSICIAN SERVICES yes 
(analog testing) 
(computer reports)
yes yes yes
LAB OFFSITE yes no no no
INCREASED
REFERENCE
TESTING
yes no yes no
DROPPED TEACHING 
PROGRAM
yes no yes no
MARKETING no no yes no
INCREASED
OUTPATIENT
TESTING
yes yes yes yes
TEST VOLUME 
DECREASED
yes no yes no
^Substitution is defined as replacing higher cost persunnel 
with lower cost equivalent.
laid off people3 avoiding the publicity of highly visible 
mass layoffs.
Hypothesis 2 did hold true for the two most pressured 
hospitals. Both of their labs had replaced highly skilled, 
licensed personnel, with less skilled, or non— 1icensed. It 
is interesting to note that Hospital A, whose lab was hit 
hardest by layoffs, eliminated less skilled workers and kept 
their highest trained (and paid) workers. Substituting lower 
paid people in the same jobs at Hospital B and C, could make 
a direct impact on bringing down their cost per case.
Staffing patterns were changed across the board, so 
Hypothesis 3 holds true for all hospitals. All four hos­
pitals had tried or were considering analog testing and com­
puter enhanced reports. Degree of pressure, either political 
or financial, does not seem to have any effect.
Hypothesis 4 had some interesting results. Two questions 
in the survey determined if a lab had contracted out for in­
patient testsCsee Appendix). Question 9 determined if a lab 
had moved any portion of its facilities offsite, and question 
10 determined if the lab was sending more of its inpatient 
testing to a reference lab. These questions appear to be 
similar, but they have extremely different consequences. If 
a lab moves part of its facilities offsite, leaving a smaller 
lab inside the hospital to perform emergency testing only, a 
drastic reduction in personnel usually occurs. If a lab just 
sends more of its work to a reference lab, smaller, or per­
haps no reduction in personnel may occur.
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Hospital A took its lab offsite very early in the first 
year it was on DRG’s. It left a small emergency lab at the 
hospital that performs about 507. of the lab procedures. The 
outside lab was established as a joint venture with a group 
of the hospital staff physicians. The cost savings to the 
hospital in such ventures can be substantial in terms of per­
sonnel and capitol equipment. Hospital A ?s administrator 
gave three reasons for the move; reduction of operating 
expense, fewer capital equipment purchases, and "loyalty 
issues" with the physician group. This hospital with fairly 
low financial pressure took a drastic step that does not fit 
the model. This may be a case where the extreme political 
pressure does modify the outcome. Overal1, Hypothesis 4 does 
not seem to hold true in two out of the four cases.
Again with Hypothesis 5, we see that two of the 
hospitals do not follow the pattern, but there may be some 
reasons for this. Hospital Lab A was forced to close their 
teaching program as a direct result of taking their lab 
offsite. With such a large reduction in staffing they were 
not able to maintain an accredited teaching program.
Hospital Lab B maintains their program, despite high 
financial pressure, only because they substitute students for 
higher paid and trained staff, especially on night shifts and 
weekends. In this way they can provide cost justification 
for the program. The accrediting agencies frown on this type 
of substitution, but it does occur in many labs. Hospital C 
and B fit the hypothesis because there are no other factors
involved, and they are a more accurate prediction of lab and 
hospital response.
The last hypothesis was true for three out of the four 
hospitals. Hospital C, with high financial pressure, has 
made some effort at marketing their lab to physicians. 
Hospitals A and D, with low financial pressure, predict­
ably did not. It should be noted that outpatient testing has 
increased for all the labs, even though only one lab has 
marketed their testing. This might be explained by a trend 
towards same day surgeries, where all lab testing is done 
before surgery as an outpatient, instead of admitting the 
patient to do the tests.
Overal1 three of the six hypotheses seemed to fit the 
data fairly well. Hypotheses 1 and 3 have to be rejected be­
cause they were true of all the hospitals studied regardless 
of their financial or political status. Hypothesis 2 is
accepted as stated. Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 may be tentatively
accepted if extenuating factors are considered. One trend 
that might be noted is that Hospital B, with the highest 
level of financial stress, does not seem to fit the model. A
possible reason for this could be the fact that this is a 
university affiliated hospital, and is the hri-county center 
for the highest technological care. These high tech units 
are expensive to maintain and support, and require very 
extensive laboratory testing. The pressure to maintain these 
services, and laboratory support, may be greater at this time 
than any other pressures.
V.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this case study did not always fit the 
model proposed. Some hospitals in the study reacted to DRG’s 
in ways that cannot be accounted for in the model. Hospital 
B had the highest financial risk and yet did not initiate 
many of the cost saving strategies the model predicted. This 
may be attributed to the type of hospital it was, which was 
unique among the hospitals in the study, As mentioned 
before, university hospitals that are regional care centers, 
may feel unique pressures to maintain service, and respond to 
those instead of financial pressure. Some of these types of 
hospitals have endowment money from sources that private 
hospitals do not have, and that may-' relieve some of the 
financial stress. A more thorough account(if available) of 
the hospital"s individual finances might have accounted for 
such discrepancies.
Hospital A also did not fit the model, since with 
relatively low financial pressure, they took a severe step 
that no other lab in the area felt they had to do. The mod­
ifying variable of political pressure might have played a key 
factor in this decision. Models such as this cannot account 
for individual decision making that might not fit the norm.
The other two hospitals seemed to fit the model much
better. Hospital C, with -fairly high -financial and political 
pressure, did initiate all but one of the proposed management 
strategies. Hospital D, had the least pressure of all the 
hospitals, and did initiate only three of the possible adapt­
ive strategies. These two hospitals are most likely rep­
resentative of the average hospital lab across the nation. A 
recent nationwide survey of laboratories indicates that more 
and more labs are adopting these cost cutting measures, along 
with efforts to increase their outpatient testing volumes.
597 of labs have reduced staffing, many have substitute 
"poorly trained aides" for medical technologists, and staff­
ing patterns have changed. At least 507 have enhanced re­
porting in some fashion, increased the amount of work sent to 
reference labs, and dropped teaching programs. Almost 707 of 
labs have marketed their services to physician offices, nurs­
ing homes, clinics, and veterinarian offices, in an effort to 
increase volume of tests.(20) It would be hard to prove that
this "507" from the survey correlates with the 507 of hos­
pitals that might be financially' and politically stressed, 
but if they were, they seem to be fitting the model as 
closely as Hospital C and D from this case study.
There are many other variables that the model does not
account for, that could be influencing management decisions, 
besides the ones that were measured, In the study, things 
like hospital type and individual decision making did have an 
influence. Management style might be a variable, in fact one 
administrator classified himself as a "proactive" manager who
was not willing to sit back and let other hospitals take the 
initiative. Intense competition and economic factors may be 
important in what types of strategies a hospital adopts. All 
of these were not accounted for in the model and may account 
for some portion of the hypotheses that dont seem to fit. I 
believe the model can be applied to other hospitals in other 
cities, if these other factors are accounted for in some way.
APPENDIX
Proposed survey for independent variables.
Contact: Chief Executive Officer or Chief Financial Officer 
( phone or personal interview )
Quest ions:
1) What type of hospital is yours, ie„ public, private, for 
profit, not for profit?
2) How many beds are you currently licensed for?
3) What was your average occupancy before DEG’s? What is it
now?
4) What is your average cost per patient day?
5) On your monthly account reports do your costs exceed your
revenues? If they have, has it happened more than one 
month, more than six months in the last year?
6) How would you characterize the political climate at your 
hospital? Explain. The financial outlook? Explain.
7) Have any local groups approached your hospital recently- 
lobbying for any issues?
8) Has their been any increased union activity in the past 
or since DRG’s went into effect?
9) Have your staff physicians repositioned themselves in any 
way to gain any advantages with adminisration?
10) Have any businesses or insurers approached you about 
special considerations for their groups?
1 1 ) When did DRG’s go into effect at this hospital?
Proposed survey for dependent variables.
Contact: Lab Manager or Lab Administrator 
( personal interview >
Questi ons:
1) What is the annual test volume in your laboratory?
2) How many employees do you have? In full time equivalents.
3) How many of those are Med. Techs., lab assistants, phleb- 
otoiiii sts, clerical or other?
4) Do you have a union in the lab? What employees are union— 
i zed?
5) Since E^RG’s went into effect at your hospital have you re­
duced staffing? If so, how? Was it by layoff, early re­
tirement, or other means? How many employees were affect­
ed and in what classifications?
6) Since E^RG’s have you substituted lower paid personnel for 
higher paid positions? How?
7) Since D R G ?s have you cnanged your staffing patterns? Are 
v .. u considering doing so?
S) Have considered offering or are you current;!,- offer­
ing new services to physicians s j. . h as analog testing, or 
computer enhanced reporting.
9) Have you moved a:. > portion of your lab off . :.e or are you 
considering doing so?
10) Since DF.Cn s, are you sending m e or less tests to re. er — 
ence labs?
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" 1 ' Do you still maintain a teach'ng program tor Med. Techs? 
It not, when did yr- drop it?
12) ftr̂  ■'oli doing any marketing of your outpatient testing to 
p' ysi c i ans?
13) Has pre-admission and post-admission testing gone up 
sine:-- DRS’s? What has been your increase in outpatient
tes ’ring?
14) Have their been any other changes in your laboratory that 
you attribute to DRG’s? What are they?
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